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ON A FRAGMENT OF GORGIAS

καὶ 'τὸ ἀγώνισμα' ἡμῶν κατὰ τὸν Λεοντίνον Γοργίαν 'διττῶν [δὲ] ἀρετῶν δέεται, τολμῆς καὶ σοφίας· τολμῆς μὲν τὸ κίνδυνον ὑπομείναι, σοφίας δὲ τὸ αἶνιγμα γνῶναι. ὁ γάρ τοι λόγος καθάπερ τὸ κήρυγμα' τὸ 'Ὀλυμπίασι 'καλεῖ μὲν τὸν βουλούμενον, στεφανοῖ δὲ τὸν δυνάμενον.' [Clement *Stromata* i. 11. 51: Stählin, Vol. II, p. 33, l. 18.]

<διττόν,> διττῶν δὲ Cobet. [δὲ] Wilamowitz, δὴ Bernays. τὸ κίνδυνον . . . τὸ αἶνιγμα (πλίγμα Diels), τὸν κίνδυνον . . . τὰ αἶσιμα (cf. *Iliad* xv. 207) Bernays, *Rheinisches Museum*, 1853, p. 432 = *Gesammelte Abhandlungen*, I, 121.

The text and apparatus are Stählin's; in Diels's *Vorsokratiker* the fragment is numbered 8 (Vol. II [3d ed.], p. 249). The latter has inserted πλίγμα into his text, comparing the metaphor καταπλιγήσει which Aristophanes attributes to Thrasymachus (*Daitales*), if Dindorf's emendation is right.

These two sentences have been assigned to the 'Ὀλυμπικὸς λόγος of Gorgias ever since Bernays detected in them the oldest prose reference to the Olympic games. He believed that the mention of the herald's summons made this certain. But then αἶνιγμα became unintelligible, and he asked whether Clement or his scribe imagined that there was a riddle competition at Olympia. So the word was emended to bring it into harmony with the second sentence, and, as may be seen from the text printed above, other words which do not suit the hypothesis that Gorgias uttered them at Olympia are now treated as Clement's additions.

But all this depends upon the double assumption that Clement drew two consecutive sentences from one speech, and that both must allude to the Olympic contest. With a writer who interweaves quotations from all sources into his discourse this is a hazardous procedure. If it can be shown that the first sentence, as it stands, is a plain allusion to a famous legendary feat of σοφία, that Gorgias had excellent grounds for comparing his own σοφία to it, and that Clement actually turns Gorgias' vaunt against vain contending with words, then the text will be justified.

When Gorgias arrived in Athens in 427, he professed himself able to answer any question addressed to him. This is the boast with which he opens the discussion in Plato's *Gorgias*, after custom had staled his triumphs. But his first exhibition in Athens was conducted in a manner so impressive that the story, repeated in the literature of rhetoric for centuries, was actually used by Themistius as the ground of a comparison with the universal instruction of the sun-god. I arrange four of these passages below, as their language sheds light upon the origin of our fragment.

1. Quorum [*sc. sophistarum*] e numero primus est ausus Leontinus Gorgias in conventu poscere quaestionem, id est, iubere dicere, qua de re quis vellet audire. *Audax* negotium: dicerem impudens, nisi, etc. [Cicero *De finibus* ii. 1. 1.]

2. Isque [sc. Gorgias] princeps ex omnibus ausus est in conventu poscere, qua de re quisque vellet audire. . . . [Cicero *De oratore* iii. 32, 129; cf. i. 22, 103.]

3. ἡ οὐ δοκεῖ σοι ὁ θεὸς οὗτος δημοσίᾳ ἐφ' ἐκάστης ἡμέρας ἐπιδείκνυσθαι τὴν σοφίαν; οὐκ εἰς τὴν πνύκα συλλέγων, οὐδ' εἰς τὴν θυμέλην παριὼν Ἀθήνησιν, ὥσπερ ὁ Γοργίας, ἀλλ' εἰς τὸ μέγα θέατρον τοῦτο καὶ ἀτεχνῶς Ὀλύμπιον, ἐν ᾧ συγκαλῶν καὶ ἀγέριον πάντας ἀνθρώπους διδάσκει τε καὶ ἐξηγεῖται πηνίκα μὲν δέοι σπεῖρειν, πηνίκα δὲ φυτεύειν, πηνίκα δὲ ἀμᾶν, κ.τ.λ. [Themistius *Or.* 26. 331a.]

4. σχεδίου δὲ λόγου Γοργίας ἄρξαι (παρελθὼν γὰρ οὗτος ἐς τὸ Ἀθηναίων θέατρον ἐθάρρησεν εἰπεῖν προβάλλετε καὶ τὸ κινδύνευμα τοῦτο πρῶτος ἀνεφθέγγετο ἐνδεικνύμενος δῆπου πάντα μὲν εἰδέναι, περὶ παντὸς δ' ἂν εἰπεῖν ἐφίεις τῷ καιρῷ), τοῦτο δ' ἐπελθεῖν τῷ Γοργίᾳ διὰ τόδε. [Philostratus *Vitae sophistarum* i. *Prooem.* 4: Diels, 76A, 1a.]

It was, Philostratus says, out of a spirit of rivalry with Prodikos, who habitually recited the stale set piece about Herakles and the two ways, that Gorgias came forward with his daring new art of extemporaneous speech. According to this account, the mark of the sophistic which Gorgias invented was that, unlike the older σοφία of Greece, those who professed it began with such bold words as οἶδα or πάλαι διέσκεμμαι.¹ Their art was like the mantic of the seers and the oracles, and took the form of the Pythian verse:

οἶδα δ' ἐγὼ ψάμμον τ' ἀριθμὸν καὶ μέτρα θαλάσσης.

If we compare such words as *ausus*, *audax*,² *ἐθάρρησεν*, *κινδύνευμα*³ with the language of Clement's quotation, and reflect that *προβάλλετε* of itself suggests *αἰνιγμα*,⁴ it is a fair inference that Clement has preserved a boast with which Gorgias presented himself to the Athenians. If the tradition may be trusted, he came before the assembly in the theater of Dionysus—that must be the theater meant—and took his stand by the *θυμέλη*. There he risked discomfiture by proclaiming that he could answer any question impromptu. And in the sentence quoted by Clement he compared his new σοφία to the legendary feat of Oedipus, who *dared to face the danger* of the man-devouring Sphinx, and won a kingdom by *knowing the riddle*. It seems probable that Gorgias marked his break with the line of Greek σοφία down to Anaxagoras (compare *Hippias minor* 281e) by this not unhappy comparison with the wise man who could say οἶδα to the Sphinx, and who

¹ Gorgias answers Chaerephon (see below) thus: ἐγὼ δὲ ἐκέينو πάλαι οἶδα.

² Plato's word is ἀφόβως; cf. *Meno* 70b: καὶ δὴ καὶ τοῦτο τὸ ἔθος ὑμᾶς εἴθικεν ἀφόβως τε καὶ μεγαλοπρεπῶς ἀποκρίνεσθαι, ἐὰν τίς τι ἔρηται.

³ νῦν γὰρ ἅπας ἐνθάδε κίνδυνος ἀνέιται σοφίας, ἥς περὶ τοῖς ἑμοῖς φίλοις ἐστὶν ἀγὼν μέγιστος. [*Clouds* 955.]

⁴ Chaerephon's impertinent question, which has come down to us, might pass for a riddle. Georgias, οὐδὲν *ταραχθεῖς*, snubbed him well (Philostratus *Vit. soph.* i. 6: Diels, 76A, 24).

used his wisdom for *political* ends.¹ In *ἀγώνισμα* we may see, not the introduction to a simile of the Olympian games, but the earliest example of the common metaphor for rhetoric, colored here, it may be, by the associations of the stage. As it is doubtful whether Gorgias mentioned the herald at Olympia, I shall leave the point till I have asked how Clement in turn applied this saying.

The chapter in the *Stromata* with which our quotation ends is a warning against the wisdom of this world, against the *ζητήσεις* and *λογομαχίαι* of false philosophers. Such pursuits and contests belong to youth. But in the Christian search too—so, I think, the connection runs—there is room for daring and wisdom. It is not difficult to discover what part these virtues play in the life of the *γνωστικός*. St. Paul's saying in the First Epistle to the Corinthians 3. 1, is virtually the text of the fifth book of the *Stromata*: *σοφίαν δὲ λαλοῦμεν ἐν τοῖς τελείοις, σοφίαν δὲ οὐ τοῦ αἰῶνος τούτου οὐδὲ τῶν ἀρχόντων τοῦ αἰῶνος τούτου τῶν καταργουμένων· ἀλλὰ λαλοῦμεν θεοῦ σοφίαν ἐν μυστηρίῳ, τὴν ἀποκεκρυμμένην* (see, e.g., v. 4. 25; 10. 65; 12. 80). A great part of this book is devoted to showing that the Christian religion, like those of the Hebrews, Greeks, and barbarians, reveals its central mysteries to the few who are chosen, in *αἰνίγμασι καὶ συμβόλοις ἀλληγορίας τε αὐτῆς καὶ μεταφοραῖς* (v. 4. 21). But again those who seize the kingdom (v. 3. 16) are 'βασταῖ' οὐ τοῖς ἐριστικοῖς λόγοις, ἐνδελεχεία δὲ ὀρθοῦ βίου ἀδιαλέπτους τε εὐχαῖς ἐκβιάζεσθαι εἴρηται. . . .

οὐ γὰρ ἐν μέσοις κείται
δῶρα δυσμάχῃτα Μοισᾶν
τῷπιτυχόντι φέρειν.

Courage, then, and the wisdom to solve the enigmas of the mysteries are needed by those who turn their backs on the *βέβηλοι κενοφωνίαι* (i. 10. 49) of this world.

There is no convincing evidence that Gorgias added the comparison of the Olympic games to his parallel with Oedipus. True, Themistius *may* have made his implied contrast between the theater made by hands and the true Olympian temple because Gorgias had named the Olympic games. But little weight can be attached to that, since his own figure of itself suggests the contrast. Nor do the balanced style and the commonplace contrast of *βούλεσθαι* and *δύνασθαι* give any firm ground for detecting the style of

¹ For a similar application of the legend of the Sphinx, see Cebes *Tabula* iii: *ἔστι γὰρ ἡ ἐξήγησις ἑοικυῖα τῷ τῆς Σφιγγὸς αἰνίγματι, ὃ ἐκείνη προεβάλλετο τοῖς ἀνθρώποις. εἰ μὲν οὖν αὐτὸ συνίη τις, ἐσώζετο· εἰ δὲ μὴ συνίη, ἀπώλετο ὑπὸ τῆς Σφιγγὸς.*

It is just conceivable that Gorgias made a topical allusion if it is true, as Fr. Marx ingeniously argues, that the *Oedipus Tyrannus* was acted in 427; but this hardly makes the comparison more happy.

² There is an echo of this phrase at the beginning of *Str.* i. 11, the chapter under discussion.

Gorgias here. In *Str.* vii. 3. 20 the same antithesis is fused with a reminiscence of *Republic* x. 617c: ἐλεῖται δὲ ὁ δυνάμενος καὶ ὁ βουλευθεὶς ισχύσει.¹ If we bear in mind that Clement twice draws upon II Timothy, chapter 2, in this discussion, the second time immediately before our quotation, and that the fifth verse of that chapter runs thus, εἰ δὲ καὶ ἀθλή τις, οὐ στεφανοῦται εἰ μὴ νομίμως ἀθλήσῃ, it is enough, in default of definite evidence, to suppose that the word ἀγώνισμα suggested another similitude for the life of the gnostic.

Clement, then, takes an arrow from the sophist's own quiver to enforce the claim of his σοφία against vain strivings with words; and the adaptation has its peculiar felicity because Gorgias himself, in breaking away from the traditional σοφία, had compared his art to that of Oedipus. Even if the presence of αἰνιγμα did not compel us to see an allusion to the story of Oedipus here, the argument gains in coherence if we suppose that the contrast between the true and the false σοφία is carried through by such a reference to an older claim.

A. S. FERGUSON

QUEEN'S UNIVERSITY
KINGSTON, CANADA

DEMOSTHENES AGAINST BOEOTUS I (xxxix). 37-38

Blass regarded these sections as an afterthought, awkwardly interpolated by the orator after the delivery of the speech; consequently he enclosed them in double parentheses, together with a later allusion to their contents (41). His reasons for refusing to give them their traditional place in the text are twofold: "Dies Stück wird ganz abgerissen eingeführt, und 39 schliesst sich genau an 36 an, nicht aber an 38. Die §38 erwähnte Thatsache trat erst nach dem Schiedsgericht, also kurz vor der Gerichtsverhandlung ein" (*Att. Bered.*, III [1893], i, 476, n. 1). Paley and Sandys of course follow Blass in their critical notation of the passage, since they have adopted the Dindorf-Blass text for the convenience of students. However, the inclusion of Blass's argument without comment in the explanatory notes indicates concurrence in his judgment. We must regard the passage as under suspicion.

To begin with the second objection, it is difficult to see why matters that took place after the arbitration, and consequently, as Blass puts it, shortly before the trial, might not have formed part of the address to the court. Blass perhaps had in mind the rule that only those facts that are introduced in evidence at the arbitration may be introduced at the trial on appeal. If so, the words "also kurz vor der Gerichtsverhandlung" are quite beside the point. In any case, the argument seems to be founded on a fundamental misconception of the procedure involved in the μὴ οὔσα δίκη, which leads Blass to assume that the filing of Boeotus' petition brought the case directly before a dicastic court, just as if an appeal had been taken.

¹ ἐλεῖται (Bywater); ισχύσει (Stählin) for MS ισχύει.